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1 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is committed to reducing the EU-15’s greenhouse gas emissions 
by 8 percent below 1990 levels in the first Kyoto period (2008-2012).1 The EU emissions 
trading system (EU ETS) is a cornerstone in EU’s efforts to fulfil its Kyoto commitments. 
The EU ETS covers 12,000 large energy-intensive plants representing 43 percent of the EU’s 
total emissions – mainly power generation and energy-intensive industries. The plants are 
found in five sectors: electricity (and heat) production, iron and steel, oil and gas, building 
materials (cement, glass, ceramics and bricks) and finally, pulp and paper.  
In March 2007, the European Council decided to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 
20 percent by 2020. One of the main policy instruments to meet this aim was the EU ETS. 
The EU ETS has been reviewed and evaluated, and this paper surveys the positions of 
electricity producers and consumers on the review of the EU ETS – more specifically, on the 
two questions of how the cap is to be set and the choice of allocation method in the third 
trading period, starting in 2013.  
The paper aims to answer two questions:  
1. What are the positions of electricity producers and consumers on cap-setting and 
allocation method?  
2. To what extent are the views of electricity producers and consumers reflected in the 
Commission’s proposal for changes in the Directive on emissions trading?   
The next section accounts for the background of the EU ETS. Section three explains the EU 
ETS review process, section four focuses on the stakeholders’ position on cap-setting, and 
section five accounts for the stakeholders’ position on allocation method. The sixth section 
accounts for the Commission’s proposal for changes in the EU ETS post-2012, and the 
seventh section concludes.   
2 The EU emissions trading system 
The Commission proposed an EU carbon/energy tax in the early 1990s. This tax was intended 
to be a cornerstone of the EU climate policy (Christiansen and Wettestad 2003:6). The tax 
met strong opposition from the industry and key member states, and the necessary consensus 
in the Council of Finance Ministers was never achieved (ibid). This tax was transformed into 
a tax on mineral oil, and focus shifted to emissions trading. Directive 2003/87/EC establishes 
a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the EU, and it is the 
emissions trading system (ETS) which is now the cornerstone of EU’s efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.   
There were many choices to be made before the EU ETS Directive was adopted. 
Markussen and Svendsen (2005) focused on four groups of issues: 1) Target group: the sector 
to be covered by the scheme, 2) allocation method: auctioning versus grandfathering, 3) mix 
with other instruments: emissions trading is considered as domestic action, project-based 
emissions reductions and links to other emissions trading systems are treated as 
supplementary to domestic action, and 4) compliance: mainly focusing on the penalty size. 
However, Christiansen and Wettestad considered the question of mandatory or voluntary 
participation in the first trading period from 2005-2007 as the most contentious issue 
(2003:13). They emphasised the German industry’s opposition to a mandatory scheme.  
1 The EU had 15 member states when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated. 
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Svendsen and Vesterdal (2003:1532) argued that the electricity sector was best suited of all 
sectors to be covered by the EU ETS because the electricity sector was responsible for one 
third of the total CO2 emissions in the EU (EU 1999), because of the many low-cost CO2 
emission reductions opportunities that existed within the sector, because the companies were 
relatively well-informed of the overall opportunities to reduce CO2 emissions in the market – 
which would lead to early trading – and finally, because the sector was already tightly 
regulated. 
According to the Directive, the EU ETS is mandatory, and the cap is set at the national 
level. The allowances are allocated for a period through the National Allocation Plans 
(NAPs). The member states then distribute the allowances among existing installations and 
potential new entrants through these NAPs. The emission cap is defined for each individual 
plant by the national government, and is based on the EU burden sharing agreement. The 
national allocation plans have to be accepted by the Commission.  
The first trading period runs from 2005 to 2007. The second trading period coincides with 
the first Kyoto period – 2008 to 2012. The third trading period starts in 2013, and the length 
of this and the following trading periods is the object of discussion in the EU ETS review.  
3 The EU ETS review process 
Responding to Article 30 of the Directive, the European Commission submitted a report to 
the European Parliament (EP) and the Council evaluating the functioning of the EU ETS in 
November 2006. Stakeholders were invited to participate in a web survey before the 
Commission’s review report was drafted by the Commission. The report identifies four 
strategic issues: 1) The scope of the EU ETS, 2) robust compliance and enforcement, 3) 
further harmonisation and increased predictability, and 4) linking with emission trading 
schemes in third countries (European Commission 2006). This paper focuses on the question 
of harmonisation. According to the Commission’s report on the EU ETS to the EP, the EU 
ETS review “will explore the option of a single EU-wide cap and that of separate national 
caps after 2012 determined by each Member State, and will explore specific issues related to 
auctioning and benchmarking” (European Commission 2006:8). Hence, cap-setting and the 
allocation process were among the issues singled out as key strategic issues by the 
Commission. 
The Directorate General Environment (DG Environment) ordered a web survey and a 
report on stakeholders’ views on the EU ETS. The survey was conducted by McKinsey and 
Ecofys in the period June 2005-July 2006. The survey was open to all stakeholders, and log-in 
data was sent to 517 companies, government bodies, industry associations, market 
intermediaries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (DG Environment 2006: 3). A 
total of 302 organisations responded. Of those that responded, 51% were companies, 25% 
associations, 11% NGOs, 7% government bodies, and 6% market intermediaries (ibid). This 
is approximately twice as high as the number of responses received by DG Environment in 
the stakeholders’ process on EU climate policy post 2012 (the process leading to the report 
“Winning the battle against global climate change”).2 
Further consultations were held in 2007 under the European Climate Change Programme 
(ECCP).3 The Working Group on the Review of the EU ETS held four meetings, focusing on 
2 The stakeholders’ process on “Winning the battle against global climate change” was, however, based 
on position papers, not a web-survey. 
3 The Commission launched the ECCP in June 2000 to identify and develop an EU strategy to 
implement the Kyoto Protocol. A second ECCP followed in 2005.  
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the four issues mentioned above. The group comprised representatives of Member States, 
industry, NGOs as well as academia and research. Figure 1 shows the number of participants 
representing industry and environmental organisations. Industry is divided into electricity 
producers (conventional and renewable power generators), electricity producers, energy 
consumers and BusinessEurope (cross sector business association). The figure shows the 
number of participants on the four EU ETS review meetings.  
 
Figure 1. Number of participants representing different sectors at the four 
meetings arranged by the Working Group on the EU ETS Review 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that electricity consumers were well-represented in the process. While 
conventional power generators sent 2-3 participants at the meetings, energy-intensive 
industries sent 8-12 representatives – in addition to the 2 participants from BusinessEurope. 
The renewable electricity industry (European Wind Energy Association and European 
Renewable Energy Council) was represented by 2-3 participants.  
Many stakeholders also submitted their views on the review of the EU ETS during the 
summer 2007. A total of 49 position papers were submitted in June/July 2007 on the EU ETS 
review. These positions papers are available online (DG Environment 2007).4 Unless 
otherwise stated, all references to stakeholders’ positions in this working paper refer to these 
position papers.  
In addition to the open stakeholders’ process on the EU ETS review, the High Level 
Working Group on Competitiveness, Energy and Environment, set up by the Commission on 
the basis of a Communication on Industrial Policy, was engaged in the EU ETS review 
process. This group gave privileged access to a selected number of stakeholders. The 18 
members of the group took part on a personal basis. Both electricity producers and consumers 
were well-represented in the group. The EU ETS review was one of the main subjects to be 
addressed by the group which had a mandate of two years.  
The EU ETS review resulted in a legislative proposal. The proposal was originally to be 
adapted by the Commission by the end of 2007, but postponed to 23 January 2008. The 
legislative proposal was presented as part of the Commission’s “Climate action and 
                                                     
4 However, two of the positions are not public. 
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renewable energy package” which also consisted of a proposal on burden-sharing between the 
Member States with regard to the non-trading sectors and a directive on the geological storage 
of carbon dioxide.   
4 Stakeholders’ positions on cap-setting 
The cap is, as mentioned above, set at the national level and varies according to the burden 
sharing agreement between the Member States. According to Christiansen and Wettestad, 
“the lack of specific targets owes largely to the understanding that the early inclusion of such 
targets would probably invoke controversies among Member States and delays in the political 
negotiations” (2003: 10). The Working Group on the Review of the EU ETS was to 
explore a single EU-wide cap versus caps determined by the Member states (national caps) 
and whether national caps should be decided up-front in the Directive or set through national 
allocation plans.  
Figure 2 shows key stakeholder positions on cap-setting. The data is collected from the EU 
ETS review position papers submitted in June/July 2007 (DG Environment 2007).  
 
Figure 2. Interest groups’ positions on cap-setting 
Interest group Type Position 
EURELECTRIC Electricity producers EU-wide, top-down approach 
Equitable burden-sharing between trading and 
non-trading sectors 
COGEN Electricity producers – 
combined-heat-and 
power  
EU-wide overall cap, alternatively EU-wide 
sectorial caps 
Cap methodology should be public as early as 
possible 
BusinessEurope Cross-sector business 
association 
Calls for evaluation of both central EU cap and 
national caps 
The Key 
Stakeholders 
Alliance for ETS 
Review 
Alliance of energy 
intensive industry 
organizations 
Long-term objectives, transparency and a 
competitiveness-neutral cap 
CEMBUREAU* European cement 
industry – electricity 
consumers 
Not absolute caps 
EUROFER* European iron and steel 
industry – electricity 
consumers 
30% by 2020 and 50% CO2 reduction per ton of 
primary iron produced beyond 2020 
 
EDF** Company – energy 
producer 
An absolute EU-cap, leading to sectoral sub caps 
E.ON** Company – energy 
producer 
Central EU cap 
CAN Europe Environmental 
organisation 
30%  by 2020. EU-level. 
WWF Environmental 
organisation (CAN 
Europe member) 
30% by 2020. EU level. Total number of permits 
to be released into a trading period decided by the 
Commission 
* Also part of The Key Stakeholders Alliance for ETS Review 
** Also members of EURELECTRIC 
 
The electricity producers advocate an EU top-down approach. Caps should be set at the EU 
level – rather than at the national level. Moreover, the producers emphasize the importance of 
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equitable burden-sharing between trading and non-trading sectors: “The electricity industry 
should not be unduly disadvantaged vis-à-vis other sectors as all economic sectors must 
engage in reducing greenhouse gas emissions if EU targets are to be achieved” 
(EURELECTRIC 2007: 6). This implies that the same cap should apply for the sectors 
covered by the EU ETS as the non-trading sector.  
The electricity consumers – represented by the alliance of energy intensive industries –
emphasises the need for long-term objectives, transparency and a competitiveness-neutral 
cap. European iron and steel producers (EUROFER) suggest 30 percent CO2 reduction per 
ton of primary iron produced by 2020 and 50 percent beyond 2020, and hence advocates a 
carbon intensity cap for the iron and steel sector. The cement industry (CEMBUREAU) also 
rejects absolute caps. EUROFER argues that a cap based on a base year (historical emissions) 
does not take into account the current or future market conditions. Moreover, allocations are 
made independent of efficiency and past efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The 
environmental organisations advocate an EU-wide cap, but they also emphasise the emissions 
reductions level, advocating 30 percent reduction compared to 1990 by 2020.  
5 Stakeholders’ positions on allocation method 
With regard to allocation methodology (allocation of allowances to sectors and installations), 
the Working Group was to explore the share of the allowances to be auctioned. If an EU-wide 
cap is applied, full auctioning was mentioned as an option by the Commission. Many 
stakeholders did prefer an EU-wide cap, and hence full auctioning was an option to be 
discussed. 
Among the topics reviewed by the web survey ordered by the DG Environment was 
stakeholders’ attitudes towards auctioning. Figure 3 and 4 show, respectively, all 
stakeholders’ attitudes and companies’ attitudes toward auctioning.   
Figure 3. Stakeholders’ attitude toward auctioning 
 
 
Source: DG Environment 2006. Survey EU ETS Review. 
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Figure 3 shows that companies and associations in general are negative to auctioning. 
Government bodies, market intermediaries and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are 
positive to auctioning. More than half of the group of NGOs prefer mandatory auctioning.                                        
Figure 4. Companies’ attitudes towards auctioning 
 
Source: DG Environment 2006. Survey EU ETS Review. 
 
Figure 4 shows the attitude of companies to auctioning. Most companies are negative, but 
there is a notable exception: approximately 25 percent of the power generation companies are 
positive to auctioning – 20 percent of the power generation companies even prefer mandatory 
auctioning. Companies in the energy-intensive sectors (steel, pulp and paper, cement, 
aluminum and chemical) do not wish to allow for more auctioning after 2012.  
Figure 5 shows key stakeholders’ positions on auctioning. The data is collected from the 
EU ETS review position papers submitted in June/July 2007 (DG Environment 2007).  
While electricity producers are split in their views on auctioning, electricity consumers 
share the same position against auctioning. Environmental organisations support auctioning of 
100 percent of the allowances. Key stakeholders’ positions on allocation method will be 
further explored in the two sections below.    
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Figure 5. Interest groups’ positions on allocation/auctioning 
Interest group Type Position 
EURELECTRIC Electricity producers Different views among their members on the 
method of allocation. If auction, on EU level. 
Benchmarking.  
COGEN Electricity producers – 
combined-heat-and 
power 
Benchmarking 
Not auctioning before there is a “international 
trading scheme with global burden sharing” 
Euroheat Small electricity 
producers; combined-
heat-and-power and 
district-heating 
producers 
Benchmarking.  
Auctioning – only if all actors, in both the 
electricity and heat markets, share a similar 
internalization of CO2 costs. 
BusinessEurope  Cross-sector business 
association 
Free allocation until an international agreement is 
reached. ‘Firmly rejects’ making auctioning the 
standard allocation tool   
The Key 
Stakeholders 
Alliance for ETS 
Review 
Alliance of energy 
intensive industry 
organisations 
Rejects auctioning for energy-intensive industries. 
Performance-based allocation (PBA) through 
benchmarks or a baseline and credit system 
CEFIC* European chemical 
industry – energy 
consumers 
PBA 
Auctioning only if world wide 
CEMBUREAU* European cement 
industry – energy 
consumers 
Until a new system (global, benchmark or 
sectorial) is implemented; no auctioning – free 
allowances to the cement industry 
EUROFER* European iron and steel 
industry – energy 
consumers  
Baseline and Credits approach  
EDF** Company – energy 
producer 
Partly through auction. Presents three types of 
allocation rules to be mixed. 
E.ON** Company – energy 
producer 
Stepwise move toward full auctioning. Additional 
climate change policy instruments should be 
removed for EU ETS participants.  
CAN Europe Environmental 
organization 
100% auction 
WWF Environmental 
organization (CAN 
Europe member) 
100% auction 
 
* Also part of The Key Stakeholders Alliance for ETS Review 
** Also members of EURELECTRIC 
 
5.1 Electricity producers’ positions on allocation method 
Markussen and Svendsen (2005:249) divide the electricity sector into large producers, nuclear 
utilities, small combined heat and power (CHP) and district heating (DH), biomass, and wind. 
The electricity producers do not have a common position of allocation method.  
The large producers typically produce electricity from several technologies – both fossils, 
nuclear and renewables. EURELECTRIC organizes large electricity producers, which have a 
wide range of interests depending on their dependency on fossil fuels. While the German 
energy company E.ON has large CO2 emissions per TWh, the French company EDF mainly 
produces electricity from nuclear and hydro – with no CO2 emissions. According to 
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EURELECTRIC’s position paper, there are “different views within the electricity industry on 
the method of allocation to use after 2012. Regardless of the method chosen, there will be 
distributional effects.” EURELECTRIC emphasises the importance of harmonized allocation 
methods and predictability. 
EURELECTRIC does not have a common position on whether more allowances should be 
auctioned post-2012. However, it has several suggestions on how auctioning should be 
applied: “Auctioning should not be limited to the electricity sector, but include all the trading 
sectors which internalise the costs of allowances in their product price. Other sectors need to 
provide a robust justification on competitive grounds why they should not be subject to the 
same level of auctioning as the electricity sector.”  This is in line with their position on cap-
setting, where they emphasize equality between the trading and non-trading sectors with 
regard to burden-sharing.  
Several members of EURELCTRIC have submitted their own position papers: EDF, EOn 
and Scottish and Southern Energy Group (the latter is not public). EDF presents three types of 
allocation rules to be mixed, while EOn considers the EU ETS.   
Euroheat & Power represents public and municipal owned CHP and DH (Markussen and 
Svendsen 2005:250). Euroheat & Power calls for a harmonised benchmark system for 
electricity and heat with two benchmarks (a double benchmark) as a starting point: one 
benchmark for heat, one for electricity. The long-term aim is an allocation system with only 
one benchmark. Euroheat & Power also underscores the importance of predictability. 
Auctioning is only considered to be acceptable if all actors, in both the electricity and heat 
markets, share a similar internalization of CO2 costs. COGEN, which represents industrial 
CHP and CHP technology producers (Markussen and Svendsen 2005:250), also advocates a 
double benchmark system, and rejects auctioning before there is an “international trading 
scheme with global burden sharing” in place.  
The European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) attended the EU ETS review process, 
and also submitted a position paper, but the position paper of EWEA was one of four papers 
not made public. However, EWEA responded positively to the energy and climate package, 
and states that “EWEA welcomes the Commission’s decision to establish full auctioning for 
the power sector from the start of the new regime in 2013” (EWEA 2008).  
5.2 Electricity consumers’ positions on allocation method 
The European energy-intensive industries have submitted a joint position through ‘The Key 
Stakeholders Alliance for ETS Review’ (the Alliance). The Alliance consists of ten European 
associations representing the European Cement Association (CEMBUREAU), the 
Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI), the Liaison Office of the European 
Ceramic Industry (CERAME-UNIE), the Standing Committee of the European Glass 
Industries (CPIV), the European Lime Association (EULA), the federation of European chlor-
alkali producers (EUROCHLOR), the European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries 
(EUROFER), the European non-ferrous metals industry (EUROMETAUX), the International 
Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers (IFIEC), and finally, the European Chemical 
Industry Council (CEFIC) -which is not covered by the EU ETS today.  
Energy-intensive industries reject auctioning as an allocation method within the EU ETS. 
Auctioning is only considered to be an option if a global emissions trading system – one that 
includes both developed and developing countries – is established. The Alliance argues that 
auctioning is unpredictable, and that the costs for companies competing with non EU 
countries would put EU industries at a competitive disadvantage without significantly 
improving the environment. The Alliance suggests that a so-called performance-based 
allocation (PBA), through benchmarks or through a baseline and credit system, should be an 
option for large emitting, homogeneous processes, while other more dispersed activities may 
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remain with an allocation based on grandfathering. The Alliance believes PBA will lead to a 
level playing field.  
The position of the energy-intensive industry is coherent and advocated not only through 
the Alliance, but also through the associations. In addition to the position paper submitted by 
the Alliance, three members of the Alliance have submitted positions papers on behalf of their 
own organisation advocating Performance-based allocation (PBA): CEFIC, CEMBUREAU 
and EUROFER. CEFIC calls for PBA – and can only accept auctioning if it is in a truly 
global emissions trading regime. EUROFER recommends PBA, through a Baseline and 
Credits approach. The baseline is the weighted average of emissions per tonne of production 
for the sector. Allowances are allocated according to baseline. Any plant performing worse 
than the baseline must pay for allocations traded from plants performing better than the 
baseline. CEMBUREAU rejects auctioning until a new system (a global emissions trading 
scheme, a benchmark, or sectorial system) is implemented. Until such a system is in place, 
CEMBUREAU calls for free allowances to the cement industry. 
BusinessEurope (former UNICE) is a cross-sector business association. The association 
organizes big industrial companies with above-average energy and emissions intensity 
(Michaelowa, 1998:157). The organization has not been able to reach one common position, 
but advocates free allocation until “a comprehensive international agreement involving all 
major emitting countries undertaking comparable efforts is established” and “firmly rejects” 
making auctioning the standard allocation tool of the EU ETS. BusinessEurope calls for a 
careful assessment of the PBA and (sector-specific) benchmarks in a cap-and-trade-system, 
but does not support any of these specific allocation methods. “For some sectors [PBA and 
benchmarks] could be a good option whilst for others an inappropriate allocation 
methodology.”  
6 The Commission’s proposal 
The legislative proposal was presented as part of the Commission’s ‘Climate action and 
renewable energy package’ on 23 January 2008. The Commission proposes to substitute 
national cap-setting by a single EU-wide cap in the trading sector. The cap is set at 21 percent 
below 2005 levels. An EU-wide cap is supposed to guarantee that the emission reduction 
objectives will be met.  
To reach the aim of 20 percent reduction by 2020, the emissions of the EU have to be 
reduced by 14 percent compared to 2005. The Commission proposes cutting emissions by 21 
percent in the trading sector and 10 percent in the non-trading sector. While the cap applying 
to the trading sector is EU-wide, the 10 percent reduction in the non-trading sector will be 
differentiated. The reduction efforts take into account the relative per capita GDP of the 
Member States. Member States having a relatively high GDP per capita should reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions compared to 2005; Member States having a relatively low GDP per 
capita will be allowed to increase their greenhouse gas emissions.5 
The choice of an EU-wide cap is in line with EURELECTRIC’s position. However, the cap 
in the trading sector is set at 21 percent by 2020, compared to 10 percent by 2020 in the non-
trading sector, and this is not in line with the position of EURELECTRIC.  The electricity 
producers’ organization had emphasized the importance of an equitable burden sharing 
between the trading and non-trading sectors. This view has not been taken into account in the 
Commission’s proposal.  
5 The Commission proposes allowing the new Member States and Portugal to increase their greenhouse 
gas emissions; the EU-15 (except Portugal) and Cyprus have to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.  
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The electricity producers were not able to act jointly by advocating one clear and common 
position. Even though EURELECTRIC and COGEN/Euroheat & Power participated in the 
EU ETS review process, they were outnumbered by the electricity consumers. 
The electricity consumers have not emphasised cap-setting – which applies to all sectors – 
but rather the allocation method. The Commission’s proposal states that auctioning should be 
the basic principle for allocation as allocation ‘is the simplest and generally considered to be 
the most economically efficient system’ (European Commission 2008: 14). Auction will also 
eliminate windfall profits. Although auctioning should be the basic principle for allocation, 
this principle will only apply to power generation (electricity producers) and carbon capture 
and storage from 2013. Other sectors will have a gradual transition from 20 percent 
auctioning in 2013 to 100 percent in 2020. 
However, energy-intensive industries might get an exemption if a post-2012 international 
agreement based on the objective of limiting global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius 
is not reached: “In the event that other developed countries and other major emitters of 
greenhouse gases do not participate in this international agreement, this could lead to an 
increase in greenhouse gas emissions in third countries where industry would not be subject 
to comparable carbon constraints (‘carbon leakage’) and at the same time could put certain 
energy-intensive sectors and sub-sectors in the Community which are subject to international 
competition at an economic disadvantage.” (European Commission 2008: 16).  
Sectors and sub-sectors threatened by carbon leakage might get up to 100 percent of the 
allowances for free; alternatively, a carbon equalization system could be introduced. The aim 
of such a system will be to put “installations from the Community which are at significant 
risk of carbon leakage and those from third countries on a comparable footing” (European 
Commission 2008: 17). An assessment of which sectors or sub-sectors this exemption will 
apply to will be made in 2010-2011. 
The Alliance of energy intensive industries was well-represented in the four meetings 
arranged by the Working Group on EU ETS under the ECCP. The Alliance also submitted 
one joint position paper/letter in June/July 2007 in addition to three position papers from 
CEFIC, CEMBUREAU, and EUROFER. The energy-intensive industries would have 
preferred to get an unconditional exemption, but the outcome can nevertheless still be 
considered successful, as no other sectors were given an opportunity to get free allowances.  
7 Conclusion 
The Commission’s proposal is not in line with the positions of the electricity producers. The 
electricity sector is the only sector – together with carbon capture and storage – where the 
principle of auctioning is applied from 2013. Nor did the electricity-producing sector succeed 
in getting an equal burden-sharing between the trading and non-trading sectors. While the 
sectors covered by the EU ETS face a 21 percent reduction by 2020, the non-trading sector 
faces a 10 percent reduction. 
The Alliance of energy-intensive industries was far more successful. Even though these 
industries did not get an exemption from the scheme, the Commission’s proposal includes an 
opportunity for an exemption for energy-intensive sectors subject to possible carbon-leakage. 
The proposal opens for free quotas, alternatively a carbon equalisation system.  
There were many strong but coherent voices from the energy-intensive industries in the EU 
ETS review process. Even though they did not fully succeed, their interests were definitively 
taken into account.  
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